In 1351, the Manichean promise had lain with a very different movement, the White Lotus Society. The White Lotus Society instigated the earliest in a series of riots which the Yuan Dynasty by itself proved incapable of suppressing. Manicheism (or Buddho-Manicheism) predicted the doom of the old order and the beginning of a new millennium of peace and prosperity. But Manicheism was itself incapable of providing the organizational rationale whereby the new era might actually be brought into being. Where Manicheism failed, Confucianism stepped in. It is the purpose of this article to discuss why and how this transformation came about.
The rise of the Ming Dynasty has never been adequately discussed in terms of the larger context of events which took place in China between the years 1351 and 1368. Such a discussion is not easy. The history of the early years of the rebellions must be painfully put together from a variety of diverse sources: the standard histories, local gazetteers, and various private writings. The official sources on the rise of the Ming (i.e., the shih-lu, or Veritable Records) are voluminous and relate everything except those facts which we should most like to know. Using the shih-lu alone, for example, one would never discover that the Ming founder had gotten his start by leading an obscure side action on behalf of someone else's rebel dynasty and that he had subordinated himself to this dynasty until as late as 1366. There is a need to view the Ming movement not only in its own terms, as if its eventual success were somehow fated, but also in terms of the major changes in events in China as a whole. This larger sequence of events seems, generally, to be orderly and comprehensible. It can be seen that when the popular riots had run their course by 1354 and when the Yuan pacification effort had collapsed late in that year, the two main centers of the original rebel leadership abandoned their Buddho-Manichean ideologies and attempted to establish dynasties of the traditional Confucian sort. In this they failed; yet both of these movements in turn spawned side actions which made stronger bids for imperial power. One of these side actions was led by Ch'en Yu-liang, and the other by Chu Yuan-chang. Chu defeated Ch'en in 1364. By the time Chu declared the Ming Dynasty in January 1368, most of China proper was in his hands. In a sense, therefore, the name "Ming" encapsulates the whole history of the civil war from 1351.
The Social Origins of the Anti-Yuan Risings. The White Lotus sectarians initiated a rising in 1351 which, thanks to Yuan ineptitude, spread and engulfed much of China by 1354. These riots have sometimes been termed peasant rebellions, which is not quite accurate. 7 The Yuan rulers themselves perpetuated yet another misconception: long after their retreat to Mongolia, they preferred to remember that a grand and sudden conspiratorial rising had toppled them overnight and driven them out of China. 8 Insofar as it reflects the paranoia which seized certain high Mongol dignitaries when the risings first grew to serious proportions, this legend bears a certain psychological truth, but as a matter of historical fact it too is completely wrong.
9 There was neither a planned conspiracy, nor was there a great rural jacquerie. The risings were unplanned, and the rebel groups were by no means largely peasant in composition at the initial stages. Rather, judging from what can be gathered from the sources, the early participants were footloose types, commonly associated with cities and market towns. They were the uprooted and the disinherited.
According to contemporary sources, some twenty local uprisings broke out in China after 1279, the year of the Yiian unification of South China. 10 In the majority of these, the leaders are reported to have incited their followers with religious or magical propaganda-prophecies of doom, claims of personal divinity, assurances of magical protection, and so forth. In some cases, the leaders went so far as to adopt dynastic names and reign titles, thus advertising an overt political challenge to the incumbent dynasty. Of these risings, four can be linked either with the White Lotus Society, or else with leaders who proclaimed the imminent descent into the world of the Maitreya Buddha, an article of faith preached by the White Lotus. What the sources do not tell us is what sort of people took part in these affairs, or why. 11 We are simply given names, dates, and a few indications of the leaders' political or religious pretensions. It would be very difficult to make any meaningful general statements on the basis of information as meager as this.
Yet the problem can, in an overall way, still be approached. The Yiian Dynasty and the Confucian scholar-officials did look upon certain social situations, and some sectors of society, with apprehension. For its part, the dynasty appears to have been particularly concerned with the immediate problem of unauthorized crowds, and the scholar-officials with a long-range but related problem, a superabundance of socially parasitic elements.
The Yiian tien-chang 12 indicates the dynasty's view that crowds should not gather without official knowledge and permission. For example, the government was concerned that two great Buddhist convocations, held illegally in Shensi province in 1309 and 1311, attracted large numbers of "mixed crowds" (men and women, religious and lay) into an area in which food was in short supply and armed protection insufficient. 13 Similarly, religious pilgrimages to the sacred Mount Tai in Shantung brought hordes of peasants, artisans, merchants, singing girls, army deserters, and boxers together for unauthorized ritual observances. The government feared that "when these ignorant and deluded people gather together, there will always be criminal elements among them. This situation not only offends the gods, but there is a danger of trouble starting."
14 In South China, street processions on religious occasion elicited similar responses from the authorities. Here, the documents make explicit the connection between crowd gathering and the sort of political-religious "rebellion" mentioned above 15 Regulations against such gatherings were repeatedly issued.
16 There were also official injunctions against the writing and dissemination 10 YS, YTC, and the anonymous Chao-pu tsunglu. On this latter work, see H. Franke, "Some Aspects of Chinese Private Historiography," Historians of China and Japan, ed. W. G. Beasley and E. G. Pulleyblank (London, 1961) 15 YTC 57.54a-b; hsin-chi, hsing-pu 90a. 16 YTC 57.43b, 45b, 46b; hsin-chi, hsing-pu 84a; Tung-chih t'iao-kp (Peking, 1930) , 27.2ib-22a; 28.14b-! 6a.
of heretical religious works and prophetical books predicting the rise and fall of dynasties.
17 There is nothing novel or startling in the Yuan attitude toward popular gatherings and religious heresies; similar attitudes were adopted by earlier (and later) dynasties. Yet it is significant that the government was suspicious, above all, of urban gatherings and mass religious pilgrimages. We find no regulations against, for example, peasant protest movements or rural tenant-farmer insurrections-a fact which can hardly occasion surprise since, as H. F. Schurmann points out, such movements were not at all common during the Yuan period.
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Probably because of the more intimate concern of the scholar-officials with the perennial Confucian task of maintaining an orderly and docile peasant society, these persons on their own probed a bit more deeply into aberrant social phenomena than did the dynasty, which was interested mainly in the immediate issue of its own security and which confined itself largely to the issuing of prohibitory regulations. 1 * Indeed, Confucians were particularly sensitive to the problem of social parasitism since it was they who in the classical social hierarchy were the chief parasites and the chief recipients of the produce and services of the other classes. Generally, Confucian doctrine demanded a maximum of producing peasants and tolerated only a theoretical minimum of artisans and merchants. Although the latter two elements were still considered part of legitimate society, the poorer members-small itinerant craftsmen, vendors, peddlers, etc.-tended to be lumped together in the Confucian mind with the followers of such despised occupations as begging, acting, musicianship, prostitution, or yamen-running. These latter occupations were outside of legitimate society; in fact, those engaging in them constituted something close to hereditary castes. 20 A contemporary scholar-official, Hu Chih-yu, offered a long list of parasitic social classes which he observed in North China late in the thirteenth century.
11 Wang Chieh wrote in alarm and outrage of the "shiftless young scoundrels" (wu4ai o-skao) and "drifters in trivial occupations" (yu-shou mo-shih) that he saw in North China. Young men, he said, were abandoning the agricultural pursuits of their forbears and were migrating to the cities where their pursuit of gambling and vice eventually compelled them to learn fisticuffs or swordfighting in preparation for a life of crime. 22 The Yuan ticn-chang noted: "if there is someone especially proficient in the use of spears and sticks, everyone pays him money and begs him to become his master.... If violent customs are not practiced and the arts of violence not transmitted, then the people will be tame and risings will not occur...
In sum, there are notices concerning a number of riots that took place in the Yuan period after 1279, and there is evidence that the government and certain of the About the kinds of people involved in the White Lotus Society in the north, we know nothing. The Han family originally had its seat at Luan-ch'eng, but sometime during the Yiian period it was exiled to Yung-nien, about fifty miles southwest, probably as punishment for its activities. 27 The control of the Han family did not extend into the Yangtze region, which did not appear to have a comparable organization until a heretical monk-healer by the name of P'eng Ying-yu helped to found one at Ma-ch'eng in 1338 or shortly thereafter. 28 We know a bit more about P'eng and his group in Ma-ch'eng than we do about the Han family's group in Yung-nien. An extant tale about P'eng Ying-yii describes at length his working of miracles and his evangelization on behalf of the Maitreya. (Berlin, 1963) , should be used with caution owing to errors in translation and annotation.
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He appears as the chief organizer of a rising which took place at Yiian-chou in Kiangsi province in 1338, in which he set up a figurehead "king" and through magical means sought to assure his men of immunity from attack. 30 After the authorities put down this rising, P'eng escaped and made his way north to Ma-ch'eng, where according to a somewhat garbled account, he helped to organize a White Lotus Society.
31 At Ma-ch'eng, P'eng became a mentor to a group which seems to have been a sworn brotherhood and was already in existence there. Among the members were the leader Tsou Fu-sheng, a blacksmith; Hsiang P'u-liieh, also known as Nu-erh, "son of a slave"; Ou Fu-hsiang, alias Tao-jen, "the Taoist"; Ch'en P'u-ts'ai, a fisherman (and father of the later warlord Ch'en Yu-liang); and Chao Fu-sheng, alias Shuangtao or "double-knife," to name a few.
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It is evident that a nucleus of rebel leadership had begun to emerge at Ma-ch'eng. The men gathered around Feng were, no doubt, of that vague category which the Confucians would label "drifters in trivial occupations;" at least none of them is mentioned as being engaged in the "fundamental occupation" of agriculture. P'eng's group on the Yangtze resembled that of the Han family in North China very closely in ideological matters, except that there was no program for a Sung restoration in the south; in their organization, however, the two groups appear to have been completely independent. In any event, these were the two most important instigators of mass revolt in 1351; and in 1355, both groups attempted to transform themselves into organized Confucian imperial movements by establishing separate "dynasties."
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The Popular Outbreaks (1351-1354). The Yiian government itself provided the opportunity for the crowd gathering that set the scene for the 1351 rebellions. In the spring of that year, on the order of the Chancellor of the Right Toghto, a labor force consisting of some 170,000 men was called up to rechannel the Yellow River, which in 1344 had shifted its course to the north of the Shantung peninsula, causing widespread flooding and destruction. 34 It was an unfortunate time for such a project. There had been an increase in banditry in recent years, particularly in the Shantung area, and certain of these outlaw groups had succeeded in openly demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the once-feared Yiian armies by their provocative actions. 35 In 1348, moreover, when the Yiian government failed embarrassingly in its attempt to suppress the Chekiang pirate Fang Kuo-chen, it granted him a title instead and thus * ChMkn Heng, p. 4. Yuan-chou is now I-ch 'un, 11 See the notice in Yuan-chou ju-cfuh (Kiangsi, 5-1 ab. Ma-ch'cng is in present-day Hupei proriace.
"Ob'iem ChVn-i, Kuo-ck'ao ch'iin-ksiung shihhkk (Shih-yuan ts'ung-shu ed.), 3.21; Chao Fang, TuatHbaa ts'un-kao (ms. ed.), "K'o-fu Hsiu-ning V*? ("Stefe on the Reconquest of Hsiuataf Hsien"), BO ch. or p. 85 Cf. Kuo Qonichi's exploit in YS 4i.4a-b; and that of the Hua-shan bandits near Nanking in YS 41.13a, and Tao Tsung-i, Cho-\eng lu (Ts'ungshu chi-ch'eng ed.), p. 443. Kuo "Qonichi" (lit. "shepherd") is a not untypical hybrid Sino-Mongolian name of the Yiian period.
in effect surrendered to him control over its own food supply. 38 When under these circumstances Toghto not only called out a huge labor force but also then even neglected to provide adequate military protection on the spot, he was indeed asking for trouble.
The White Lotus chieftain Han Shan-t'ung did not pass up the opportunity which the Yuan government afforded him. He and his followers came south from Yung-nien to the scene of the diggings in order to win converts from among the laborers. One device which they used was to bury a stone figurine of a one-eyed man at the scene of the works where the laborers would be sure to dig it up. On the back of the figurine were inscribed the words: "Do not say that the stone man has only one eye; when this is dug up, the empire will rebel."
37 This was apparently intended as a reply to a popular children's rhyme which had been circulating since 1350. The rhyme went: "A stone man with one eye; when they channel the Yellow River, the empire will rebel."
38 That Han Shan-t'ung did not succeed in winning over very many of the workers is evident from the fact that the project continued on without interruption until it was completed in December 1351; but he did induce some of them to desert, possibly those whom the officials had deprived of their rations 39 The White Lotus Society was again active after about a decade of quiescence. As can be gathered from the tale of the figurine, it was predicting a collapse of the reigning dynasty. It was spreading Buddho-Manichean messianic propaganda about the sxpected arrival of the Maitreya and his earthly paradise. Its hereditary chieftain Han Shan-t'ung boasted direct descent from the emperors of the Northern Sung. And this was not all. A direct appeal to the poor and oppressed was put forth in the slogan: "While poverty is extreme in Kiangnan, wealth is boasted in Although the White Lotus insurgents went so far as to "sacrifice a white horse and a black ox, and make oaths to Heaven and Earth," and to wrap red cloths around their heads (hence their epithet, "Red Turbans") and burn incense in honor of the Maitreya (hence their other epithet, "Incense Army"), they did not strike out on their own in open and overt rebellion until local officials forced their hand by seizing and arresting Han Shan-t'ung. 41 The rest of the Red Turbans then decided that they had either to rebel at once or be arrested in turn. On May 28,1351, barely a week after the assembling of the 170,000 laborers, the rebels captured the Huai-area city of Yingchou 42 After Han Shan-t'ung's arrest, his wife took their son Han Lin-erh and fled for safety. 43 The leadership of the rebellion was then taken over by two men: Liu Fu-t'ung, of whom nothing is known, except that he was a sectarian (yao-jen) and a native of Ying-chou; and Tu Tsun-tao, of whom one account relates that he had once submitted a memorial to the government recommending reforms in the military system and had been offered a minor official post as a result.
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It was twenty days before the Yiian emperor could be reached to authorize the dispatch of forces against the rebels, and thus the government lost the initiative.
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Before the summer was over, the rebels had captured a large bloc of territory along the upper reaches of the Huai and its tributaries, comprising some half dozen cities and about 50,000 square miles of land. What might otherwise have been only one more item in the catalogue of Yiian "religious riots" had turned into a major insurrection.
It is possible to pinpoint some of the mechanics of this phase of the rebellion. The original nucleus of White Lotus partisans began to gather concentric rings of followers, or Red Turbans. There were the deserters from the Yellow River project; there were numbers of clerks recently dismissed from their jobs as a result of a government policy of closing down unnecessary offices; there were "illiterate loafers from the countryside" who overran at least one city, looted or threatened to loot the homes of the rich and forced them to inscribe their banners for them 46 Local bandits took advantage of the uproar to come into the open and plunder.
47 Both men and women took part in forcing open the local government granaries and in the killing of local officials. In some places, people gathered in crowds of hundreds to chant the Lotus Sutra, possibly in order to hasten on the Maitreya's arrival. 48 A contemporary commentator has it that because of the great inequality between the rich and the poor, many of the poor were "glad to join the rebellion."
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Word of the conflagration in the upper Huai area soon spread and ignited secondary centers of rebellion. Hsii-chou, an important city of the eastern Huai located on the Grand Canal, fell on August 31 to Sesame-seed Li (so called because his family owned a granary of sesame); Chao Chiin-yung, a she-chang, or community leader; and Feng Ta, a kind of local strongman.
50 Local crops could not be planted owing to a labor shortage caused by the Yellow River project, and promised government relief was not forthcoming. One account emphasizes, however, that the three men were after "riches and honor" and decided to seize Hsii-chou only after hearing of the events to the west. At Hsii-chou they set up a banner, recruited a mob and, soon after, overran some half dozen cities of the eastern Huai.
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Other rebel power centers sprang up in the eastern Huai area. Hao-chou fell in March 1352 to a group of rebels which included Kuo Tzu-hsing, whose father was a well-to-do fortune-teller and mother a rich family's unwanted blind daughter. Kuo was a "swashbuckling type who enjoyed keeping retainers about him." Indeed, Kuo attached to himself the future Ming founder Chu Yuan-chang when he came to Hao-chou seeking to join the rebels.
52 During 1353, the ex-salt-smuggler Chang Shih-ch'eng and his brothers seized control of a rebel movement originally led by one Wang K'o-jou, a member of a wealthy clan of T'ai-chou. Chang by 1353 occupied an arc of territory which stretched north of the important Grand Canal and Yangtze River city of Yang-chou. Early in 1354, Chang declared a Great Chou Dynasty, with its capital at the Grand Canal city of With the Grand Canal blocked by the rebel occupation of Hsii-chou and Kao-yu and the sea lanes under the control of the pirate Fang Kuo-chen (and after 1354, Fang for the first time established himself permanently on land), the Yuan capital lost its food supply entirely. 54 Finally, P'eng Ying-yii's group at Ma-ch'eng rose up in the autumn of 1351 and triggered a social explosion of truly stupendous proportions. A cloth peddler of impressive size and demeanor by the name of Hsu Shou-hui was discovered by P c eng and his men (according to one account, Hsu was observed emitting a strange light while he was taking a bath in a river) and was installed as figurehead emperor of the rebels' newly declared Tien-wan Dynasty.
55 "Tien-wan," meaning something like "heaven-preserved," as a dynastic name was as untraditional as the riots carried out in its behalf were unprecedented. By piecing together notices from the Yuan shih, the local gazetteers, and the extant private writings of the landlord gentry, one can get a good if not unbiased view of the full extent of these disorders. In all, the Tien-wan occupied some 200,000 square miles from the area of the modern province of Hunan east to the sea. This territory was not under centralized control, for at this stage the Tien-wan in reality was not a government. From the Ma-ch'eng center there marched forth at least six different rebel columns (one was led by Tsou P'usheng and P'eng Ying-yii in person; it seems that P'eng was killed enroute). 56 As each column proceeded, it picked up hordes of new adherents (Red Turbans) from among the bandits, idlers, and "shiftless and evil youths," together with others, presumably peasants, who were "stupid and deluded," as the gentry writers put it. Everywhere, "shiftless scoundrels" took advantage of the situation to rise up, fashion makeshift weapons, dress themselves in red cloth, and join the conflagration.
It is not difficult to discover that the chief victims of this mass outburst were the local officials on the one hand and the Chinese landlord gentry on the other. As for the officials, it was the policy at least of the Tien-wan commander Hsiang P'u-liieh (or Hsiang Nu-erh) to humiliate them publicly by forcing them to acknowledge Hsu Shou-hui as emperor and killing them if they refused. 57 The landlord gentry were occasionally massacred 58 ; more often, as is evident from the private writings of the early Ming period, the rebels simply pillaged and destroyed thier homes, because the owners had fled beforehand. An inscription describes succinctly the rebel entry into the city of Shao-wu, located in Fukien near the Kiangsi border:
On June 3, 1352, they sent bandits waving flags and carrying placards to the border to Shao-wu, where they forced some three hundred commoners to carry 53 Wu K'uan, Fing tvu lu (Chieh-yiieh shanfang hui-ch'ao ed.), ia~3b; T'ao Tsung-i, p. 439; Yeh Tzu-ch'i, 3.9a. T'ai-chou is now T'ai-hsien, Kiangsu. white cudgels and enter the city shouting and yelling. Upon hearing of the approach of the rebels, the officials and people took their families and fled ahead of time. The rebels took advantage of this and occupied the local government yamen. The next day, in order to gather more adherents, the rebel leaders announced that they were going to overthrow the rich and benefit the poor. Since the penniless folk all wanted riches, and all of those nursing hatreds wanted revenge, they rose up in flocks to join the rebels. They soon gathered a large number of people and entered and plundered the homes of the wealthy. No one was spared.
YS 42.14a £F. and passim; T'ai-chou fu-chih
6 ® Yet it is also true that the anarchy unleashed by the T'ien-wan went deeper; there are reports of tenant-farmer insurrections, real jacqueries which were only remotely connected with the T'ien-wan riots. 60 And too, in those places where the original followers of P'eng Ying-yii were able to maintain a presence, the religious element seems to have mitigated the class war aspects of the rebellion. Thus when Hsiang Fu-liieh entered the famous city of Hangchow, he and his men seem to have been more intent upon proselytizing than destroying. According to reports, they distributed copies of the "prophetical scriptures" and entered the names of the converts to the Maitreya faith into registers. On departing Hangchow, however, they were careful to take with them cartloads of gold and silk, together with official documents. 61 Hsiang and his men continued north from Hangchow, opening granaries and distributing grain to the poor as they went. 62 Hsiang was captured and executed shortly afterward while returning westward; his enraged followers then took revenge by destroying the villages of all those involved in his arrest 63 In sum, between the years 1351 and 1354, there took place largely disorganized and spontaneous revolts which engulfed the whole heartland of China from the Yellow River south. These rebellions were sparked by the White Lotus Society from two original centers, Yung-nien and Ma-ch'eng. 64 As the rebellions spread, they picked up more and more followers: first the "shiftless" elements, as the Confucians termed them, who appear to have been mainly young fellows; then, these rioters in turn encouraged the outbreak of rural protest movements, including bandit activity and tenant farmer risings. 65 According to the Ming founder Chu Yuan-chang's own account, "masses of the people dropped their farming, seized weapons, and ran to join the rebel leaders." 66 The landlord gentry had upon occasion during the Yiian period supported, or threatened to support, local rebellions until their demands upon the government were met. It appears, however, that the popular rebellions of 1351 and later took them by surprise. If the gentry attempted to make contact with the rebel leaders, they obviously did not succeed; indeed, they bore the brunt of the violence. In consequence, the gentry were obliged to side with the Yuan government **Sha>-wu ju-chih (Fukien, 1897), 13.20b.
Chi, Yun-yang chi (ms. cd.), 8. 34 a-36a. • l C£. Tao Tsung-i, p. 437; Yang Wei-chen, Tung-wei-txu wen-chi (Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an cd.), 22.14*-b; YS 42.18b.
M Yin K'uci, Ch'iang-chai chi (ms. cd.), 4^-4a; alto cf. Wang Ch'ung-wu, "Lun Yuan-mo nungmin ch'i-i ti fa-chan shui-picn chi ch'i tsai li-shihthang 10 ch'i ti chin-pu tso-yung" ['The Development and Transformation of the Late Yiian Peasant Huings and their Progressive Effect on History"], Li-shih yen-chiu, No. 4 (1954), p. 99. 68 Chao Fang, loc. cit., note 22 above. 64 Actually, the whole area around Ma-ch'eng was declared Lien-t'ai (Lotus Platform) province, and the Tien-wan capital was established at Ch'ishui, a hsien about 40 miles south of Ma-ch'eng. 65 On banditry as a social phenomenon, sec E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York, 1965) . 66 Quoted in Mcng Ssu-ming, p. 212. Chu's remark applies to the area around Hao-chou. against the rioters. The cases of the pirate Fang Kuo-chen and the salt-smuggler Chang Shih-ch'eng were, however, a little different; neither was a sectarian adherent, and each quickly gained local support and established himself as a regional warlord.
Yet there seems to have been a fundamental ambiguity in the early mass outbreaks. If millennial doctrine was embraced and rebellion initiated by monks, artisans, and people engaged in nonessential occupations, and these in turn incited other distressed groups, then it would also appear that the groups further removed from the core of the rebellion were the less firmly commited to it. The peasants were particularly sway able; and herein lay the key to the next stage. There was no natural alliance between the local peasants and the local "shiftless elements" who guided invading Red Turbans to the homes of the rich and destroyed them. Indeed the local gentry, frightened by the rebels' approach, very frequently succeeded in patronizing the peasants, including especially the poorer ones, by spending their own resources upon them. Even more, peasants who had already joined the rebel ranks could be shamed, pardoned, and offered inducements to join the gentry side as militia. If there were competition between rebels and gentry for the allegiance of the peasants, the gentry would appear to have the advantage.
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The Transformations of Popular Rebellion. The great riots briefly described above were for the most part ended by 1354. The Yuan government had, in the circumstances, no recourse but to allow the Chinese landlord gentry to recruit, train, and lead peasant militia forces (i-ping) against the marauding Red Turbans. These gentry-led militia, frequently in cooperation with local officials, succeeded in pacifying large enclaves around the chief prefectural cities in China south of the Yangtze from 1354 onward, but in the process they left a highly fragmented pattern of political power. No one man arose politically supreme in South China. In the Huai region, by contrast, the White Lotus advance was turned back by militia forces under the command of a landowner named Chaghan Temiir, a man apparently of Uighur origin.
68 By the time of his assassination in 1362, Chaghan Temiir had succeeded in dominating the anti-rebel effort to such an extent that he was able to establish a warlord regime of his own over much of North China. After his death, his political and military machine passed into the hands of his nephew, Koko Temiir.
Imperial Yuan armies under central control did see limited action against the Red Turban rebels in north and south. The Yuan court, moreover, attempted to maintain some control over the process of militia formation either by forming its own units, or by granting military rank to private individuals (often merchants) who were able to field a certain number of men 69 Yet the conclusion seems inescapable that the dynasty had, in spite of these efforts, allowed the preponderance of military power to fall into outside hands. The landlord gentry, hitherto forbidden any contact with military affairs, were now suddenly in charge of large bodies of mili-67 There are many references to this phenomenon: cf. Cheng Yii, Shih-shan chi (1535 printed ed.), i8.5a-b; Li Chi-pen, 1-shan wcn-chi (Hu-pei hsiencheng i-shu ed.), 6.i2b-i3a; Yin K'uei, 4.3a~4a; Sung Lien, pp. 637-38. tia forces. As a result, the Chinese gentry and the Mongol imperial commanders soon found that their interests conflicted in spite of their common opposition to the Red Turbans. In addition, the Yiian government was in many cases unable to exert any real measure of control over its own militia units, which were obliged to see to their own food supply. Yiian militia commanders on the whole had to fend for themselves, and often they did not hesitate to disobey orders or even change sides if it suited their interests. Yiian hopes for a "restoration" could not, therefore, be placed in these men; only a Mongol of towering prestige, whose personal fortunes were intimately connected to the salvation of the dynasty, and who at the same time had support among the Chinese landlord gentry, had any real chance of reviving the Yuan state.
It appeared for a time that the Chancellor of the Right Toghto himself might be this perspn. In August 1352, a full year after the beginning of the risings, Toghto received imperial permission to command an expedition against the rebel-occupied city of Hsii-chou. Leading a force of 20,000 men, including salt workers, river project laborers, and "city ruffians," Toghto recovered Hsii-chou on October 29. 70 Then he made long and careful plans for the reduction of the other Grand Canal city of Kaoyu, occupied by Chang Shih-ch'eng, and for this purpose he assembled a large army consisting of Koreans, Central Asians, and Tibetans in addition to the regular imperial forces. But Toghto's whole career had built upon the opening of bureaucratic career opportunities to large numbers of officials (including especially many Chinese) through his great projects-the Yellow River project of 1351 was one, and the Hsu-chou and Kao-yu campaigns can be considered as two others. These enterprises antagonized many conservative Mongols, who felt threatened by the influx of Chinese in government. In December 1354, just as Kao-yu was about to succumb, Toghto's enemies engineered his downfall. He was divested of all ranks and titles and banished to his estates. Several contingents of his army deserted and turned outlaw. Whatever its real prospects, all hope for a Yiian restoration was now gone.
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By 1354, none of the sectarian rebellions was in a flourishing state. The great mass outburst had run its course. In many places, particularly in South China, pacification was nearly complete and reconstruction had already begun. The White Lotus rebels of the north now held little more than the city of Po-chou, 72 and the T'ien-wan leaders, driven from their capital at Ch'i-shui, were forced to find refuge in the nearby mountains. When the Yuan government, by its dismissal of Toghto, decided not to sponsor the repression, it in effect forfeited its mandate and compelled the landlord gentry to discover new sources of leadership.
We now arrive at a crucial point; into the vacuum which the Yiian Dynasty had created there now stepped the very rebel leadership elements which had originally opposed both the gentry and the dynasty. Now largely shorn of their former mass support, these leadership elements made a complete strategic reversal. They dropped their messianic programs and for the first time began to organize seriously. Instead ™YS 42.18b; 138.29b; TTSL I 276, Ch'uan Heng, p. 16 . See also the stele, "Yuan To ch'enghsiang p'ing-Hsu sung-te-pei" ["Laudatory stele on Yuan Chancellor Toghto's Pacification of HsuchcxT}, of which Acidemia Sinica in Taiwan possesses a rubbing. 138.31b; 139.5b; 187.3b; Koryo sa I, , Nung-t'ien yu-hua (Pao-yen-t'ang mi-chi ed.), B.5a-b; p. 440; Ch'iian Heng, p. 18; Wu K'uan, 4a. 72 Now Po-hsien, Anhwei.
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of attacking the landlord gentry, they now tried to win them over by building with their advice embryonic imperial regimes of the traditional kind. This new development began shortly after the collapse of the Yuan campaign against Kao-yu. In the case of the Tien-wan, it is apparent that the new opportunities afforded the rebel leaders by the failure of the Yuan pacification effort produced a crisis within their camp; some of the old rebel chiefs were averse to the betrayal of their original messianic ideals and opposed the shift in strategy which the more opportunistic elements wanted. Consequently, it was necessary for the latter to shunt aside, or to murder, the advocates of the old messianism. Early in 1355, we find Ni Wen-chiin initiating this process within the Tien-wan camp. During 1355 and 1356, he recaptured a number of cities along the Yangtze west of Ch'i-shui and in the area of modern Hunan province; and after moving the Tien-wan capital west to Han-yang, he installed the emperor Hsu Shou-hui there as his captive. Ni failed in an attempt to induce the Yuan government to grant him the title of Administrator (p f ing-chang) of Hukuang province. He also failed in an attempt to assassinate Hsu Shou-hui. Shortly after, Ni was himself murdered by a lieutenant, Ch'en Yu-liang, son of one of the original Ma-ch'eng brethren.
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Ch'en Yu-liang, far from reversing the new T'ien-wan trend toward empire, continued it. But where Ni had sought to base his empire in the Hunan area, Ch'en concentrated upon the richer and more strategic area of Kiangsi to the east. By 1358 he had taken most of it.
74 Ch'en, however, expanded his territory very rapidly and sacrificed tight control for mere acreage. Instead of compelling the Kiangsi landlord gentry to trade their local power positions for posts within his central administration, Ch'en simply gave them offices and official seals and left them where they were. His conquests brought about the downfall only of the local Yuan officials. The gentry were therefore at liberty to negotiate with someone else as soon as Ch'en's leadership drive should falter. One Kiangsi gentryman, who had built a village self-defense system, recruiting, supplying, and rewarding his own men, stated it this way: "The view of the local magnate (hao-chieh) is this-to rule his own area, await the purification of the empire, and then choose carefully the one to whom he will render allegiance/' 75 By 1359, the revived T'ien-wan regime fell into distinct western and eastern halves, with the emperor Hsu Shou-hui and his supporters in control of the former and Ch'en Yu-liang in charge of the latter. In these circumstances, Hsu tried to transfer his capital from Han-yang east to Lung-hsing (now Nan-ch'ang) in Kiangsi, in order to ensure the incorporation of Ch'en's newly won territory as well as Ch'en's own continued subordination to the T'ien-wan cause. Ch'en met the emperor halfway, and there in a sudden move he murdered all of Hsu's close supporters, leaving the emperor a puppet in his hands. Ch'en Yu-liang then named himself King of Han, appointed a central bureaucracy of his own, and established his capital at Chiangchou (now Chiu-chiang).
The name "Han" is not without significance in this context. Much of Ch'en's support came from the Kiangsi landlord gentry, who had been supporters of the Yuan cause in 1352. The dynastic name "Tien-wan" was both ungainly and untraditional. The name "Han," by contrast, recalled the first of China's great dynasties and was practically synonymous with China itself: an appeal to gentry rather than chiliastic lower-class sympathies. In 1360, while engaged in a major (and unsuccessful) assault upon Chu Yuan-chang to his east, Ch'en dropped all pretense, assassinated the former cloth peddler Hsu Shou-hui, and assumed for himself the position of emperor ol the Han Dynasty. The Ticn-wan was one sectarian leadership nucleus that underwent drastic transformation after 1355. The other was the White Lotus Society of North China, which originally started the riots of 1351; and here the situation was a bit more complex, perhaps because we are more fully informed about certain parts of it. The White Lotus chieftains, it will be remembered, claimed descent from the Sung emperors; yet significantly it was not until 1355 that Liu Fu-t'ung and Tu Tsun-tao went so far as to establish formally a new Sung Dynasty. Han Lin-erh, in hiding since 1351, was enthroned as Great Sung Emperor with the reign title of Lung-feng (Dragon and Phoenix: both imperial symbols). The new Sung capital was established at Po-chou, not only because it was the only city the rebels were in firm control of, but probably also because ol its having been the capital of the ancient Sung state during the spring and autumn period (722-484 bJC.). Early in 1355, Liu murdered Tu and thus came into complete control of the Sung central government. There is no indication that Han lin-erh (commonly known as hsiao ming-tvang, or Lesser Prince of Radiance) ever wielded power in his own right.
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Liu Fu-t'ungs Sung regime was short-lived but spectacular. His strategy was to make alliances with remaining rebel groups wherever they happened to be, give official ranks and badges of authority to their leaders, and assign them certain areas tor attack. Thus a group of rebels at Hsiang-yang on the middle Han River invaded the important Wei River valley of Shensi during 1356 and 1357; a £ rou P Turbans located in the Liaotung Peninsula was invited to cross the Gulf of Chihli and occupy Shantung in 1357; anc * a group of Szechwan rebels known as Green Turbans during the same year marched north through the mountains and briefly overran the far western end of the Wei River valley. 7 ® Liu himself mounted an offensive north across the Yellow River and into the T'ai-hang mountains.
80 During 1358, while Liu moved the Sung government and imperial entourage into the former northern Sung capital of Pien-liang (K'ai-feng), his Shantung allies attacked and nearly succeeded in taking the Yiian capital, while a grand expedition under "Master" Kuan and "Broken-head" P'an overran the Fen River valley of Shansi. 81 The year 1358 marked the high point of the Sung effort; from 1359 there was a rapid decline. The very nature of the Sung strategy on the one hand, and the growing power of Chaghan Temiir on the other, quickly erased the fruits of conquest. The Sung capital of Pien-liang, together with the Sung empress, five thousand Sung officials and their families, and a large number of seals, tallies, and precious goods fell to Chaghan Temiir in September 1359. 82 Liu Fu-t'ung and the figurehead emperor Han Lin-erh then fled south. Only in Shantung, apparently, did the Sung have time to set up the rudiments of an orderly traditional-style administration: a tax of one-fifth upon all private lands; the establishment of military-agricultural colonies; the honorific burial of Yiian zealots; the search for employable talents. 83 But the chief Sung provincial official in Shantung was murdered by a rival in 1359, and Shantung fell into anarchy. 84 The invasions of Korea in 1359 and 1361 (the latter led by Kuan and P'an) were unsuccessful individual actions. 85 The Sung imperial movement itself failed, yet its activities indirectly benefited other pretenders. Through its wide-ranging attacks it kept the Yiian Dynasty fighting for its life, and Chaghan Temiir tied down in North China. The Huai region immediately to the south, the scene of the 1351 risings, was now too ravaged to support a dynastic movement, and by 1355 almost all of the rebel groups had evacuated it. The double cordon which resulted effectively sealed off South China from any interference from the north; and it was in South China that the two great rivals for the Mandate of Heaven-Ch'en Yu-liang and Chu Yuan-chang-fought for supremacy alone.
A Side-Current: Chu Yuan-chang. Chu Yuan-chang was born in 1328 to a poor but socially ambitious peasant family of the Huai region. 86 Pestilence and famine in the 1340's left him the only surviving member of his immediate family, and so he entered a local Buddhist monastery as a novice in order to keep himself alive. Forced to leave the monastery when it too ran out of food, he took his staff and begging bowl and spent several years traveling about the Huai region. Some scholars presume that the young monk came into contact with the White Lotus Society and possibly even with P'eng Ying-yii during this time; Chu left behind several short memoirs of his early years, but he always passes over these several Wanderjahre in silence. His known connection with popular rebellion began only in 1352, after his return home, when someone denounced him to the authorities as a rebel and a friend invited him to join the Red Turbans at Hao-chou. Chu began as a private soldier, but he rapidly became a principal commander and advisor to his patron, Kuo Tzu-hsing.
He also became Kuo's son-in-law by proxy; Kuo married to Chu a ward left in his custody by a friend, a man of violent temper who had joined the rebels because he was wanted for murder. 87 Chu's personal tie to Kuo, one of the chief Hao-chou rebel leaders, was crucial to the early stages of his career. He furthered himself by his successes in battle against the Yiian forces; by his personal recruitment of a large number of men; and, not least, by exploiting the animosities that existed among Kuo and the other Hao-chou rebel chiefs.
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Chu's realization of the stupidity of the Hao-chou leadership awakened his appetite for power, while his openness to advice from his own personal entourage enlarged it. 8 ® Chu began attracting a staff of semi-intellectuals of the Huai area about him while he was still in Kuo Tzu-hsing's service. Around 1353, Feng Kuo-yung joined him. Feng was "fond of study" and "thoroughly versed in the military claslies." His advice was simple and timeless. "Advocate benevolence and righteousness," Feng cautioned. "Win over men's minds, refrain from the pursuit of luxury, and the pacification of the empire will be no difficult matter." 90 Li Shan-chang, studious as a youth, was particularly well read in the statist philosophy of Legalism, and advised that Chu take Liu Pang, the peasant founder of the Han Dynasty (202 B.C.-A.I>. 220) as his personal model 91 Fan Ch'ang, grandson of an obscure Huai-area Confucian gentleman, suggested that it is the basic nature of man to love life and hate killing. The empire is now in turmoil, and people are anxious and afraid because they cannot protect themselves. You must concentrate upon dispersing disorder and saving the people; you must cease all unnecessary burning and slaughter. Select good troops; have half of them fight while the other half guards the cities. Select lenient elders for local officials. Then the people will be able to plow and harvest in peace, and their crops will not be stolen by marauders; men will gather from the four quarters, and the empire will be easy to pacify." 92 Within two years after he first joined the rebellion, Chu had his own "brain trust," which included some ten men.
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Chu's staff did more than offer advice; they were also administrators. Thus Mao Chi had charge of granaries and acted as a kind of military censor, checking up on commanders who failed in battle. 94 Li Shan-chang was, among other things, responsible for interviewing the various bandit chiefs and local defense commanders who sought to join Chu. Li also saw to it that none of the rest of the civilian staff monopolized communications between Chu and the various field commanders in such a way as to impede military operations 95 The further away Chu was from the formal leadership of the Hao-chou rebels, the brighter his prospects became. He was at least in part responsible for the decision to reduce Ch'u-chou 95 Now Ch'u-hsien and Ho-hsien, in eastern Anhwei north of the Yangtze.
